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Abstract
This article considers recent policing and regulatory responses to 
the night-time economy in England and Wales. Drawing upon the 
findings of a broader two-year qualitative investigation of local and 
national developments in alcohol policy, it identifies a dramatic 
acceleration of statutory activity, with 12 new or revised powers, and 
several more in prospect, introduced by the Labour Government 
within its first decade in office. Interview data and documentary 
sources are used to explore the degree to which the introduction 
of such powers, often accompanied by forceful rhetoric and high 
profile police action, has translated into a sustained expansion of 
control. Many of the new powers are spatially directed, as well as 
being focused upon the actions of distinct individuals or businesses, 
yet the willingness and capacity to apply powers to offending 
individuals in comparison to businesses is often variable and 
asymmetrical. The practice of negotiating order in the night-time 
economy is riddled with tensions and ambiguities that reflect the 
ad hoc nature and rapid escalation of the regulatory architecture. 
Night-time urban security governance is understood as the outcome 
of subtle organizational and interpersonal power-plays. Social orders, 
normative schemas and apportionments of blame thus arise as a 
byproduct of patterned (structural) relations.
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Introduction: Urban spaces and the night-time economy
The current debate on anti-social behaviour and violence in our urban 
environ  ments is but the latest in a long tradition of public disquiet over 
the urban condition. Over the last decade, the night-time economy (NTE) 
and its regulation, management and policing has emerged as a key focus 
for urban public policy, reflecting the changing character of urban sites, 
particularly the rise of a new alcohol-fuelled, consumption-driven, night-time 
high street (Hadfield, 2006; Hough and Hunter, 2008). The transformation 
of many urban centres has been remarkable, with the commercial and 
civic remnants of past economic eras having morphed into ‘themed’ pubs 
and ‘designer’ bars and clubs, thus mirroring the ubiquitous chain stores, 
designer boutiques and franchised coffee shops of daylight consumption. 
These licensed premises are often clustered into easily identifiable zones, 
notable for their youth-orientation and focus upon alcohol consumption as 
key social activity, economic driver, and cultural motif.
As a result of these environmental characteristics, nightlife zones are 
contested spaces. Social disorders, such as public drunkenness—observable 
as stable patterns of socially proscribed behaviour amongst the street 
population—elicit very different perceptions and emotions among different 
groups of people (Innes, 2004; Sampson, 2009). Whether observed through 
direct experience, or vicariously through local gossip and media filtration, 
these dramas of intoxication signal fun and adventure for some, and 
danger, stress and anxiety for others (Thomas and Bromley, 2000). Given 
the perennial attractions of being ‘where the action is’ (Goffman, 1967), 
Britain’s major nightlife areas routinely entice up to 100,000 revellers, a 
transient population whose footfall places severe stresses on extant modes 
of governance within these sites of consumption.
In response to the pressures associated with the NTE, novel attempts to 
develop and sustain ‘partnership’ working are emerging from an increasingly 
variegated mix of agencies including police, local authorities, health trusts, the 
licensed trade, security companies, residents groups, and charitable/voluntary 
agencies. Since November 2005, these activities have been orchestrated 
partly in accordance with the four statutory objectives of the Licensing Act 
2003: the prevention of crime and disorder, the promotion of public safety, 
the prevention of public nuisance and the protection of children from harm. 
The importance of this legislation cannot be underestimated as it has inserted 
the control of alcohol into the heart of urban governance (see, for example, 
Department for Communities and Local Government, 2009: 20).
The pairing of situational crime prevention technologies with various 
forms of spatially-targeted powers that threaten restrictions on the presence, 
behaviour, and movement of individuals and groups, is now ubiquitous 
in British towns and cities, as in other cultural contexts and jurisdictions 
(Hadfield, 2009a). This intense activity has been informed by the realization 
that private security governance, as performed by pubs and clubs, is 
neces  sary, but insufficient to tackle the problems of (dis)order generated Hadfield et al.—Policing and regulating the night-time economy 467
within these social milieux (Hadfield, 2008). Attempts to exert control 
over night-time spaces often find themselves out-of-step with the culture 
of excess prominent in many peoples’ drinking practices (Martinic and 
Measham, 2008; Measham and Brain, 2005; Room, 2007). They may also 
face resistance from those businesses who supply, and in many cases help 
generate, such demands. As such, the normality of anti-social behaviour 
within the NTE raises dilemmas of governance in terms of the limits of 
regulation and control (Garland, 1997).
This article explores contemporary state responses to the NTE as a 
regulatory dilemma. It begins by tracing the recent history of police campaigns 
and new legislation which involve major, prima facie, intensifications of 
state control. Various civil/criminal and public/private mechanisms for 
regulating public and quasi-public space are then described and analysed on 
the basis of the findings of a recent qualitative research project on local and 
national alcohol policy.
Controlling the night: A decade of grip tightening
Toward the end of the 1990s, pronounced rises in recorded violence and 
criminal damage were correlated with temporal and spatial patterns of 
economic development within the NTE (Hobbs et al., 2003; Home Office, 
2001; Warburton and Shepherd, 2004). In combination with major reforms 
to the licensing laws, introduced through the implementation of the 2003 
Act, a highly politicized context emerged in which public, media and prof-
essional concerns regarding alcohol-related crime and disorder (and the 
health implications of national drinking patterns) conspired to create a crisis 
of legitimacy for the British state. As a consequence, numerous concessions 
in the form of new powers and funding for police and local authorities 
were made to counterbalance or reconfigure what had been a thoroughly 
neo-liberal policy agenda in which the alcohol industry appeared to have 
‘captured’ the means of their own regulation (Hadfield, 2006; Room, 2004). 
Subsequently, a series of Home Office funded enforcement campaigns were 
orchestrated between 2004 and 2007 under the auspices of the Alcohol 
Misuse Enforcement Campaign (AMEC), the Tackling Underage Sales of 
Alcohol Campaign (TUSAC) and the Responsible Alcohol Sales Campaign 
(RASC) to tackle alcohol-related disorder. These police-led campaigns 
were augmented by a significant ‘ramping up’ of formal police powers and 
(administrative) regulatory options, which provided the authorities with 
more diverse methods and sanctions aimed at regulating the (mis)conduct of 
individuals but also the ‘risky’ operational practices of businesses profiting 
from the sale of alcohol (both at on and off-licensed premises), for example, 
the selling of alcohol to underage drinkers or those already drunk. Hence 
the regulatory drive was aimed at those on both the demand-side and the 
supply-side of the market in alcohol sales, with the latter being held Criminology & Criminal Justice 9(4) 468
culpable for the often intoxicated and sometimes disorderly behaviour of 
the former.
Table 1 variously categorizes the main interventions into one of three 
forms: those focusing on specific persons, specific places (the subject of which 
may be individuals or groups occupying particular locations, or businesses 
operating within such locations), or individual licensed venues. Many of 
the powers are notable for their risk-based preventative logic that functions 
through processes of surveillance, identification, categorization, and ex-
clusion. For example, the (licensing) powers to close premises temporarily 
in order to tackle disorder can be both reactive and anticipatory. Further 
civil injunctions are, of course, available to local authorities in relation to 
noise nuisance. Whilst these powers overlap, to some degree, with those 
intended to address alcohol-related disorder, they remain beyond the scope 
of this article.
Research design
In exploring the implications of the powers within this list, this article draws 
on the findings of a two-year research project which combined an intensive 
twin-site case study with broader explorations of the national dimensions 
of alcohol policy formulation and delivery. Local contexts and actions 
were explored in a 715,000 population city in the North East of England 
and a geographically dispersed, 335,000 population, metropolitan district 
comprising several small to medium sized towns, in the North West of 
England. Fifty in-depth interviews were conducted in these sites (25 in each) 
between June 2007 and December 2008, with a further seven local residents 
participating in a focus group at the latter location. The locations were 
selected in order to compare different local contexts and to explore elements 
of their specificities or convergences of approach in response to central 
government dicta. Interviewees were selected purposively to encompass 
representatives of all the major and more minor regulatory players: Crime 
and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs), police, council licensing 
departments, social services, health and treatment services (statutory and 
voluntary), education and young peoples’ services, government regional 
offices, Chambers of Commerce, drinks retailers, residents’ groups and 
voluntary sector associations.
To encompass the national policy arena and its interplays with the local, 
a further 20 interviews were conducted with prominent figures in central 
and local government, the police, health care, the legal system, the drinks 
and leisure industries, and a range of professional and non-government 
organizations, including charities and pressure groups. Interviews were 
semi-structured around established and emergent themes and sought to 
explore the views of those who shape various facets of national alcohol 
policy and its interconnections with local policy development and delivery. 
A range of stakeholders in the research sites and nationally were asked to Hadfield et al.—Policing and regulating the night-time economy 469
Table 1.  Recent legislative powers and sanctions relevant to tackling crime and disorder in the 
night-time economy in England and Wales 
Nature Type
Enabling 
legislation Power / Sanction
Person-based Anti-Social 
Behaviour 
Orders 
Crime and 
Disorder Act 
1998, s.1
Civil orders widely used to exclude persons 
from public space, including night-time 
drinking areas
Penalty 
Notices for 
Disorder 
Criminal Justice 
and Police Act 
2001 s.1
Summary fines which police and accredited 
persons can issue for a range of low-level 
disorder offences, often associated with 
alcohol consumption
Drinking 
Banning 
Orders 
Violent Crime 
Reduction Act 
2006 s.1-14
A civil order excluding ‘risky’ individuals 
from licensed premises within a defined 
geographical area
Place-based Directions 
to Leave 
a Locality
Violent Crime 
Reduction Act 
2006 s.27
Police can require persons to leave a 
specified locality if that person is judged 
likely to contribute to alcohol-related crime 
and disorder 
Dispersal 
Orders 
Anti-Social 
Behaviour Act 
2003 s.30-36
Police can exclude groups of two or more 
persons from a designated area, where 
their behaviour or presence is likely to be 
perceived by others as anti-social
Designated 
Public Places 
Orders 
Criminal Justice 
and Police Act 
2001 s.13
Allows councils to identify public places 
in which the consumption of alcohol is 
prohibited and can be confiscated by the 
police
Cumulative 
Impact 
Policies
Guidance 
accompanying 
the Licensing 
Act 2003 
Allows for a refutable presumption against 
the granting of new Premises Licences, 
or variations to licences so as to extend 
opening hours, within a given area
Alcohol-
Disorder 
Zones 
Violent Crime 
Reduction Act 
2006 s.15-20
Allows licensing authorities to design an 
action plan to remedy alcohol-related 
problems within a specified area 
Venue-based Licensing 
Conditions
Licensing Act 
2003
Allows licensing authorities to specify how 
premises will be run, including the required 
introduction of various crime prevention 
measures 
Licence 
Review
Licensing Act 
2003 s.51
Allows a responsible authority or an 
‘interested party’ to request a review of the 
licence conditions
Licensing 
Enforcement 
Powers
Licensing Act 
2003 Pt. 7
Restates the offences of supplying alcohol 
to a) under-age drinkers and b) those 
deemed to be drunk, and allows authorities 
to check compliance by test-purchases
Closure 
Powers 
Licensing Act 
2003 Pt. 8
Allows police to close temporarily certain 
premises, or all premises in a specific 
area, where there is actual or anticipated 
disorder, or to abate noise-related nuisanceCriminology & Criminal Justice 9(4) 470
reflect upon the rationale and implementation of the various powers. Some 
of the views expressed related to powers already implemented, while other, 
yet-to-be introduced measures, were judged in prospect.
A new era of nightlife governance
The various new or enhanced powers shown in Table 1—all introduced 
since 1998—have intensified but also re-orientated the nature of state 
control within the NTE, drawing together webs of actors as regulator 
and regulated deploying different levers of control and compliance. Until 
New Labour’s first term of office in 1997, long-established governmental 
structures and responses prevailed in which police, licensing magistrates, 
local authorities, and leisure businesses played distinct and largely non-
integrated roles. Public policing methods were predominately characterized 
by the ‘fire brigade’ model of reactive vehicle-based response and the 
‘swarming’ of crime scenes (Hobbs et al., 2003), while licensing operated 
as a largely distinct administrative technology for regulating alcohol sales 
(through the magistracy) and public entertainment in the form of ‘music 
and dancing’ (through local authorities). The Licensing Act 2003 served to 
intertwine these governmental fields, bringing both activities into the remit 
of a single licensing instrument (the Premises Licence) and single jurisdiction 
(the local authority licensing committee). Urban security governance thus 
became explicitly linked to control over the availability of alcohol and its 
conditions of sale, and to a tacit censorial role in the regulation of associated 
cultural activities (Hadfield and Measham, 2009).
As local authorities also hold jurisdiction over land use planning for leisure 
venues they are, in principle, able to control the NTE in both form and content 
(trading hours, physical design and capacity, managerial methods, licensable 
activities, spatial distribution). Yet the various mechanisms of procedural 
justice, de-regulatory checks and balances, appeal and precedent built into 
the planning and licensing systems significantly restrain local government 
action, establishing more equitable power relations between regulator and 
regulated (Hobbs et al., 2003; Roberts, 2009) Subsequently, the police, 
rather than local authorities, have arguably gained the greater leverage 
over the governance of the night in recent years. The Licensing Act 2003 
allocated police a key role as ‘responsible authorities’ within the licensing 
process, with the power to make ‘representations’ to the licensing committee 
regarding licence applications, to instigate reviews, and propose mandatory 
conditions. It is an oft-overlooked fact that in the absence of representations 
from responsible authorities or interested parties licensing committees are 
not at liberty to deny new Premise Licence or licence variation applications. 
Thus Cumulative Impact Policies, for example, become operable only upon 
receipt of such representations, with responsible authorities (primarily 
police) also prominent in providing much of the evidential bases (local crime 
and public nuisance data) for their initial development.Hadfield et al.—Policing and regulating the night-time economy 471
Controlling space/controlling persons
The recent growth of highly discretionary police powers was widely 
welcomed by practitioners concerned with securing order and safety in 
the NTE. While these powers were seen to provide the police with greater 
options and flexibility when asserting authority among night-time denizens, 
their use appears to be inconsistent owing to concerns over implementation 
difficulties, but also the extent to which they address in any meaningful 
way the nature of the problematic behaviour. A case in point were Penalty 
Notices for Disorder (PNDs), which can be issued for a variety of offences 
that may arise in nightlife areas, from being disorderly whilst drunk in a 
highway, other public place, or licensed premises, to buying or attempting 
to buy alcohol for consumption by a person under 18 in licensed premises, 
or urinating in a public place. Although known as ‘on-the-spot-fines’ and 
designed inter alia to reduce police bureaucracy by enabling the police to 
issue a swift, summary punishment (see Young, 2008), they were regarded 
by police at one of our sites as strictly a case disposal option for the custody 
suite following arrest, and often only after the ‘offender’ had spent a night 
in the cells to sober up. This approach was adopted in light of official 
guidance issued to the police that suggested initial aspirations for rapid, 
street-based disposal may be unworkable as ‘a penalty notice will not be 
appropriate where the suspect is unable to understand what is being offered 
to them, for example ... where the suspect is drunk or under the influence of 
drugs’ (Home Office, 2005: 19, para 7.3). Hence, although section 5 Public 
Order and ‘drunk and disorderly’ offences account for 60 per cent of all 
PNDs (Ministry of Justice, 2008), their use in the NTE is at least partially 
constrained by other concurrent demands on the custody suite as well as 
street policing, more broadly.
Spatially-focused, person-directed approaches raised similar concerns, 
specifically surrounding the intoxication and hence mental incapacity/
vulnerability of the target groups. For example, what might happen to a 
drunken person if they were ordered by the police to leave an area and 
possibly their friends? Likewise, as Crawford and Lister (2007) discuss 
in relation to dispersal orders, there were also concerns that place-based 
powers may merely displace disorder, particularly owing to the recidivist 
nature of many ‘problem drinkers’:
you can confiscate alcohol from people all day long, but if you don’t address 
the issues around that, then you’re just gonna be doing it every day…unless 
you actually try and look at ways of preventing them re-offending, you’re not 
gonna solve your problem. (Police Sergeant)
Concerns over the failure of such interventions to address the underlying 
causes of alcohol-related crime and disorder were aggravated by a lack of 
data sharing associated with discretionary and summary disposals, which 
prevented offenders’ details from being matched against those held by 
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the identification of patterns of offending, the engagement of alcohol arrest 
referral schemes and other support and treatment services.
Interestingly and perhaps—as will become apparent later—significantly, 
Drinking Banning Orders (DBOs) were more positively received. Our 
interviewees regarded them as an important aid in supporting the civil powers 
of exclusion invested in licensees who are more directly and proximately 
responsible for governance within the publicly accessible, but privately 
owned spaces of pubs, bars and nightclubs. Partnership mechanisms such as 
the local trade-led ‘Pubwatch’ forums—in which licensees and police share 
information and cooperate in crime prevention initiatives—were instrumental 
in this respect. Acting as ‘knowledge brokers’ (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997), 
police circulated photographs of known offenders to all Pubwatch members 
which were then recorded in albums and displayed on montages behind the 
bar. Registered under the Data Protection Act, Pubwatch members were also 
able to generate their own intelligence for distribution among their network 
and with the police. In one area, the local Pubwatch had authorized the 
police to issue a banning order which excluded alcohol-related offenders 
from all their members’ licensed premises. Although secondary to formal 
penalties, the imposition of this extra-legal sanction was reported to have 
had a strong deterrent effect in that the resultant deprivations spoke directly 
to the focal concerns of offenders, thwarting their ability to inhabit those 
social milieux from which the seductions of violence first emanated (Winlow 
and Hall, 2006):
They’re [the banning orders] effective…because people are starting to say, 
not, ‘how much am I gonna be fined, how long am I going to prison?’ It’s 
‘am I going to be banned from the pub?’ And there’s more of an issue over 
not being able to get the drink down your local than there is about the other 
consequences … It has a big social impact on those individuals that it affects. 
(Police Sergeant)
Controlling space/steering commerce
While the effectiveness of banning orders and the Pubwatch schemes that 
support them relies upon voluntary co-operation and co-dependency with 
the licensed trade, premises-directed powers represent clear attempts by the 
state to ‘govern at a distance’ by ‘responsibilizing’ licence holders for the 
control of crime and disorder in, and increasingly around (e.g. any pave-
ment, beer garden and smoking area) their venues (see Department for 
Culture Media and Sport, 2007: para. 1.26). Police and licensing authorities 
expect that licencees and their staff should be held responsible not only for 
the ‘responsible’ sale of alcohol, but also for complying with many other 
statutory requirements and regulations (such as specific sets of licensing 
conditions) relating to the running of their premises, which may cover a 
myriad of issues, including substantial emphases on ‘security’ and ‘good 
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activity that has taken place in recent years has sought to underline such 
expectations, wherein complying with imposed licensing conditions is seen 
as a means of minimizing the risks of disorder. The levers of compliance 
here are largely instrumental. Sanctions for non-compliance threaten the 
commercial viability of licensed premises, whether in the form of fines, or 
the financial costs borne from being required by licensing authorities to 
introduce (costly) crime prevention technologies, changes to profitable and 
established operating practices, or ultimately to close down (temporarily or 
otherwise) a venue.
Enforcement activity in respect of breaches of statutory requirements and 
licensing conditions is a matter for council officers, both from licensing and 
environmental departments. These officers are in regular contact with each 
other and with police and sometimes make ‘multi-agency’ inspection visits 
to premises in order, as one council licensing officer put it, ‘to advise and 
inform licence holders what their responsibilities are’. In both areas, data 
within and between agencies was collated, risks evaluated and premises 
categorized in the form of a ‘problem premises register’. Premises raising 
concerns across a spectrum of community safety issues, from high levels 
of drunkenness and violence, to noise escape, glass injuries, and customers 
slipping over on wet floors which had not been properly cleaned, were 
classified as ‘poorly operated’. In accordance with the principles of effective 
enforcement described in the Hampton Report (2005), once graded into 
categories of risk, those premises identified as ‘underperforming’ (i.e. as 
presenting a high risk of hosting crime and disorder) were then selected for 
further proactive surveillance, inspection and enforcement operations.
Our findings suggest that regulators are more inclined to gently steer 
businesses towards compliance with licensing conditions than threaten 
them directly, or proceed with coercive action. There was much evidence of 
restraint and even reticence in applying the range of powers and sanctions at 
their disposal. For example, the number of PNDs issued for selling alcohol 
to a drunken person increased between 2006 and 2007 from 47 to only 81 
(Ministry of Justice, 2008), despite the Home Office placing this offence 
to the fore within its Responsible Alcohol Sales Campaign of 2007 (Slade, 
2007). Tellingly, within one of our sites, Pubwatch members were, in many 
instances, warned of the timing of such blanket enforcement operations as 
a ‘reward’ for their cooperation in other matters. This conciliatory position 
was explained in terms of the fear of driving a wedge between interlocutors 
who had little choice but to work together, often on long-term bases. 
Thus, the real utility of premises-directed powers was to provide regulators 
with a position of strength from which to enter a process of dialogue with 
licensees and thereby negotiate graduated outcomes in the shadow of the 
law (see Hawkins, 1984; Manning, 1987). Such negotiations might typically 
surround the drafting of non-contractual ‘memoranda of agreement’ 
between the police and licensees concerning a suite of preventative security 
measures to be adopted. Review proceedings were regarded as a breakdown 
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occurring only where licensed operators were judged recalcitrant, recidivist 
(incapable of resolving serious and recurrent problems), or more rarely, 
openly defiant of police authority. As one police licensing officer explained, 
the introduction of a sliding scale of regulation was regarded as having 
permitted the authorities greater leverage over the actions of operators:
The Review process is really really good. Now before I used to have licensed 
premises taking the mick. The only thing I could do if they didn’t respond to 
partnership activity was go down the revocation route, which was like the 
nuclear option. And of course, they would fight [it] because this was their 
business. Well under the Review process, we can call them in, have their 
licence looked at, and potentially just add conditions rather than completely 
close them down ... It’s a far more measured approach.
The previous licensing system, under the Licensing Act 1964, therefore, is 
presented as one in which licensing justices were understandably reluctant 
to countenance the imposition of a loss of livelihood upon licensees, save 
in the gravest of circumstances. This lack of flexibility had the effect of 
restricting enforcement options, allowing low-level miscreants to operate 
with relative impunity, as recalled by the same licensing officer: ‘I remember 
the frustration of it. All we ever really used to do was put an entry in the 
licensing register … nothing ever seemed to change’. The threat of Review 
now acts as a key determinate in achieving compliance:
Obviously they’re scared to death, the licensed trade doesn’t want to go to 
Review and neither do we, this is the thing, neither do we. But we will if we 
have to … And every now and again, there are serious incidents that we have 
to just go straight for the stick. But we won’t do so out of choice. (Police 
Inspector)
It is now possible, many felt, to improve operating standards in ‘problem’ 
premises without undertaking the detailed case work involved in Review and 
the protracted legal and quasi-legal wrangling elicited by any subsequent 
engagement with the appeal process. Chinks in the armour of enforcement 
continued to exist and it was typically through the trade’s engagement of 
specialist licensing lawyers that these might be exposed. The simple action 
of requesting an appeal against the licensing authority’s decision often 
frustrated police intentions, leading as it typically did to significant periods 
of delay (up to two years) awaiting a hearing date in the Magistrates’ Court. 
During such time, the appellants remained free to trade ‘as usual’ without 
having to comply with the licensing authority’s judgments.
The Guidance to the 2003 Act makes it clear that, ‘Licensing authorities 
should only impose conditions which are necessary and proportionate for the 
promotion for the licensing objectives’ (Department of Culture Media and 
Sport, 2007: 10.15). The question of weighing proportionality, of course, 
remains a grey area, but one which can raise the stakes, making appeals 
more likely. For example, in granting a licence variation to permit trading 
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least three door supervisors during this time period. This additional cost 
might outweigh the commercial value of the extended trading period, thus 
resulting in the business choosing not to use the hours it had obtained.
There were also concerns from residents’ representatives that the Review 
and appeals processes, lauded by government as major contributors to local 
democracy, still discouraged participation by members of the public due to 
lapses in the system of notification and the need to present oral evidence 
before a council chamber, or court of law, which many people found inti-
midating (Hadfield, 2006). Moreover, there were concerns that public sector 
professionals were often dismissive of residential complaints, especially 
if this threatened established understandings, or working relationships 
with the trade. Licensees seen to be cooperating with regulators through 
Pubwatch, for example, were suspected as having significant bargaining 
power over the treatment they received from licensing authorities, while 
there was no guarantee that residents could call upon police to support their 
representations, for example, against a Pubwatch member’s application 
to extend the hours of his or her licence. More broadly, our focus group 
with residents revealed deep-seated concerns over the extent to which their 
views on local licensing issues were taken into account by the authorities, 
particularly the police. Despite possessing formal statutory rights as 
‘interested parties’, residents expressed frustration over the ways in which 
the informal instrumental relationships and bureaucratic imperatives which 
characterized local governance over the night tended to thwart opportunities 
for community mobilization.
Strategic governance of the night-time city
Strategic area-based approaches are intended to ensure that while 
responses to alcohol-related crime and disorder may be strong in dealing 
with events, they do not remain weak in dealing with processes. Under 
the Guidance to the 2003 Act ‘cumulative impact’ refers to the effects of 
a significant number of licensed premises concentrated in one area where 
there is evidence that the environmental impacts of all these premises, taken 
together, is undermining the licensing objectives. In zones designated for 
Cumulative Impact Policies (CIPs), the burden of proof for new Premises 
Licence or licence variation applications is reversed and applicants must 
address the licensing authorities’ concerns in their proposed Operating 
Schedules. More specifically, the applicant must show that the proposed 
operation is in some way ‘exceptional’ and will not therefore add to the 
problems which necessitated the policy. Given that this tier of regulation 
served to establish a barrier to market entry for new businesses, existing 
licensees in the designated zones were, it was widely suggested, content 
for CIPs to remain unchallenged. Local authorities, however, were coming 
under political pressure from residents to create new CIPs, or to extend 
the spatial and temporal reach of existing ones. These demands were not 
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rather as unwelcome and unwarranted external pressure which threatened 
to disrupt carefully constructed strategies, alliances and ways of working. 
The following quotation is illustrative:
My battle at the moment is with people who want the CIPs extended … 
Strangely enough, I get no pressure from the trade to drop them and I think 
that’s because, although their lawyers want the business, the trade are 
quite happy with the hours they’ve got. I mean, it’s also interesting that it’s 
improved the value of their licences. (Council licensing officer)
Professional reticence concerning ‘untutored’ lay demands for CIPs emerged 
partly in response to the need for robust and legally defensive policies that, 
in accord, required painstaking development both of their wording and the 
evidential bases (containing quantitative and qualitative data) underpinning 
them. Moreover, there needed to be strong political will to maintain the 
legal momentum required to defend them:
when it goes to appeal, the magistrates find themselves saying ‘well the 
residents want 11 o’clock and the stress area policy says 11 o’clock, but the 
applicants are saying one o’clock, so we’ll give them midnight as a sort of 
compromise’. In one city, I’m talking with a council that doesn’t even act if 
a representation comes in support of its own stress area policy. So it’s [the 
CIP] hardly worth the paper it’s written on. (National civic amenity group 
activist)
Some CIPs were worded in such a way as to discourage applications only 
from certain ‘types’ of licensed premises that are commonly associated 
with greater risk of disorder, such as the ‘high volume vertical drinking 
establishment’. As understandings of what might constitute such premises 
remain ill-defined, the city’s CIP could easily be sidestepped:
If they come up with all the crime prevention measures I want, I don’t object 
to them. So you haven’t effectively stopped these areas from getting new 
premises … I think if it comes to it, they’ll remove the furniture and they’ll 
pack people in. Then, if they start to cause us problems we’ll take them to 
Review. But once they’ve got the Premises Licence, it’s too late effectively … 
the cumulative impact thing is by the by. (Police licensing officer)
The above reflections illustrate the challenge regulators face in attempting to 
address issues of ‘criminogenic process’ through legal mechanisms designed 
to preserve individual rights, such that each application must be judged on 
merit.
While CIPs were generally regarded as a useful tool for what one council 
officer described as ‘freezing the situation’; that is, preventing further 
environmental degradation, other mechanisms were seen as more suitable 
for reducing existing problems. ADZs provide a further strategic tool for 
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is not always possible to identify a clear relationship between crime and 
disorder occurring in the public realm and specific licensed premises, as 
offenders may have visited several premises in the course of an evening. 
ADZs aim to generate ‘improvements’ on an area-wide basis through the 
placing of a mandatory levy on licensed operators for the costs of CDRP-
initiated crime control measures; levies are to be calculated individually for 
each premise within the designated zone in accordance with their rateable 
value and hours of operation.
Although operational in law for almost a year, no area has so far (as 
of June 2009) seen fit to impose an ADZ. This may be due, in part, to the 
accompanying guidance (Home Office, 2008) which frames the creation of 
an ADZ as an action of ‘last resort’ to be used only where other remedies 
have failed. It may also have to do with the instrumental fear of robust legal 
challenge from the national bar chains. Accordingly, in our research sites, 
ADZs were discussed with limited enthusiasm by interviewees from all sides 
of the alcohol policy debate. Much of this reluctance stemmed from the 
expressive qualities of the policy, specifically the assumed symbolic power 
of the label to define an area in terms of its high crime rate. Identifying 
a drinking circuit, or an entire town centre, as a hot-spot for disorder 
was thought to convey clear messages about the nature of risk and social 
relations within such places. This, it was feared, might deter ‘law-abiding’ 
people from visiting the area who may otherwise have contributed to 
enhanced levels of informal social control—an assumption supported by 
research concerning the socially mediated perceptual bases of ecological 
classifications and spatial difference (Sampson, 2009). While making the 
area less attractive to the legitimate visitor, it was thought likely to have the 
further effect of drawing in a disreputable contingent intent on adding to the 
area’s existing problems.
Before initiating an ADZ, Home Office guidance encourages CDRPs to 
work with licensees in drafting an area-wide ‘action plan’ which might involve 
asking for voluntary financial contributions towards initiatives such as taxi 
marshals and patrols by uniformed council ‘street ambassadors’. However, 
if the broader governmental objective is to lever resources from the private 
sector to fund additional services (policing or otherwise) within nightlife 
areas then their emergence seems likely to be usurped by the introduction 
of Business Improvement Districts (BIDs). The Local Government Act 2003 
and the Business Improvement Districts (England) Regulations 2004 permit 
the development of private sector-led partnership initiatives in the form of 
BIDs, which are financed by a levy upon businesses and aspire to create 
a ‘safer trading environment’. BIDs differ from ADZs in that it is the fee 
payers, rather than the regulatory authorities, who establish and control 
the initiative. In November 2007, Nottingham city centre became the first 
area in the UK to create a BID scheme committed solely to the needs and 
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Discussion
It was clear from our interviews that premises-directed regulatory and 
enforcement activity was regarded as an interactive process in which the 
authorities entered into negotiation with the regulated and with interested 
parties. Powers—and especially, strategic area-directed powers—were used 
sparingly, their main utility being as levers or incentives for change, which 
encouraged compliance even if rarely directly applied with force (Braithwaite, 
2002). Notions of the ‘attitude test’ in relation to the application of coercive 
powers were as pertinent here as in classic portrayals of the street policing 
encounter (Van Maanen, 1978). In dealing with licensed premises, especially 
the national chains, CDRPs thus applied a form of ‘smart power’, involving 
a judicious combination of hard (coercive) and soft (co-optive) elements 
(Nye, 2004).
Interviewees within CDRPs referred to the communicative properties of 
‘tough laws’ and ‘clampdowns’ in demonstrating to the public that ‘some-
thing was being done’, yet were skeptical of centrally-driven enforcement 
campaigns due to the time-limited nature of the prioritization and additional 
resources. Several interviewees referred to parental ambivalence over 
alcohol, for instance, parents sending mixed-messages around their own 
drinking practices and the expectations they placed upon their children. 
Practitioners were conscious of their incapacity to deal with the issue of 
alcohol’s availability within the home and of the need to work with parents 
to discourage the purchase of drinks for their children. One informant 
referred to the development of local action to formalize such interventions 
through the use of Parenting Contracts, or Parenting Orders.
In relation to individual offenders—primarily, the disorderly ‘binge 
drinker’—the inability of punitive, generalized and spatially-oriented anti-
social behaviour powers to nurture pro-social protective behaviours emerged 
as a major theme. The chronic necessity for police to focus on crowd 
control, public order maintenance and visible reassurance in nightlife zones 
at peak times resulted in limited capacities for arrest and routine proactive 
visits to licensed premises. Thus, notions of effectiveness were linked to 
the degree to which enforcement actions could be sustained and combined 
with other forms of targeted action in the long-term. Recent Home Office-
instigated ‘crackdowns’ utilizing such powers were widely seen as ‘sticking 
plaster’ approaches (Crawford and Lister, 2007), most effective in tending 
the symptoms of a distempered social order, but ill-equipped to promote 
its systemic recovery. Our interviewees saw aspects of youth culture and 
wider societal attitudes to alcohol as providing positive endorsement for 
hedonistic, sometimes aggressive, drunken comportment; thus presenting 
stubborn root causes. Images of ‘urban grit’ (Talbot, 2007), the spectacle of 
crime (Tomsen, 1997), and tales of ‘daring do’ (Grazian, 2008) continued 
to stoke the fires of the NTE’s perennial appeal. These euphoric, almost 
celebratory elements of youthful nightlife culture are perfectly captured in 
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the desired and recreational elements of violence in which some of the 
night’s denizens ‘secretly … want it all to kick off, they want arms flying 
every  where and bottles as well’ the band (in their late-teens at the time the 
song was written) highlight a crucial dichotomy in the framing of social 
interaction that is typical of everyday distinctions between night and day: 
‘This town’s a different town today. This town’s a different town to what it 
was last night. You couldn’t have done that on a Sunday’ (The Ritz to the 
Rubble).
The ambiguous and hyper-vigilant (in some cases, arguably hypocritical) 
public and political sensibilities around alcohol being as they are, one 
problem faced by regulatory authorities was that of trying to reduce 
alcohol-related harms associated with the NTE without being drawn into 
the stigmatizing rhetoric within which much debate about young peoples’ 
drinking was framed. Tensions were heightened in local communities as a 
result of the normative aspects of the alcohol policy agenda and the clash of 
lifestyle, values and meaning attribution which constituted the contestation 
of urban space. The following views, expressed within our local residents’ 
focus group, are illustrative of such tensions:
They don’t think that people are sleeping, they don’t care that people are 
sleeping, and nobody is controlling that particular bit of garden. So they 
think, ‘hey, we’re free, we can do what we like’. And they do because they’re 
young people who are drunk.
Working with the licensed trade to limit ‘irresponsible’ supply was therefore 
regarded as necessary, but not sufficient. Some powers such as the ASBO 
were distinct in their emphasis on future conduct and an expansion in the use 
of contract and conditionality. Consumers could be taught ‘care of the self’ 
(Foucault, 1986) through health risk-focused and social norms education, 
thus stemming their demand for alcohol. Yet, summary disposals such as 
the PND provided little scope for engagement with the welfarist/disciplinary 
aspects of the criminal justice system, wherein ‘conditional cautioning’ and 
‘alcohol arrest referral’ schemes acted as gateways into treatment services 
designed to help people ‘straighten out their lives’. Some respondents 
cautioned, however, that anti-social behaviour powers and premises-focused 
action must remain to the fore in providing rapid response to the distinct 
pressures that arose in locations where visitor numbers vastly outstripped 
those of the residential population toward which any longer term educative 
approaches might be directed.
Different social groups had varying capacities for choice and negotiation 
of the sometimes complex relations of inclusion and exclusion that operated 
in nightlife settings (Hadfield, 2008, 2009a; Marlière, 2007; Measham and 
Hadfield, in press; Moloney et al., 2009; Talbot, 2007). These processes 
had both formal and informal constituents, the former notably including 
the work of door staff and the expansion of surveillance technologies such 
as Identity Scanners at venue entrances, whilst the former related to the 
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individuals and groups (Hadfield and Measham, 2009a). Thus, problems of 
order in night-time public spaces were generated, in part, by the fact that 
not all of those attracted by the ‘bright lights’ of the city found a welcome 
from licensed premises, not all of those welcomed by licensed premises 
found a welcome from the police or local residents, while relations between 
different groups of visitors could themselves be fraught or antagonistic. 
Place-based powers sought to respond to such governmental challenges as 
key components of a new ‘toolkit’ of urban control which favoured pre-
emptive action, socio-spatial demarcation, and the embedding of proscribed 
consumption patterns and behavioural norms (Crawford, in press). This was 
not, however, simply the latest instalment of efforts to control the socially 
excluded ‘dangerous classes’. Temporality mattered, not only in relation 
to the unruly life of night but as a result of its political economy: drunken 
comportment was fuelled by the bonus and giro cheque alike, both provid-
ing the lifeblood of an important and established leisure economy.
In highlighting the attempt to remove disorder from key day-time citadels 
of consumption (notably, the shopping centre) liberal urbanist scholars have 
failed to account for the increasing centrality of such night-time consumer 
locales. Here one sees a gulf between the cultural norms of the night-time 
high street’s core constituency (and thus, the ‘included’, as well as the ‘the 
excluded’) and those of control agents. Any notions of the purification of 
urban public space and police potency in relation to such settings, should, we 
argue, be regarded as mythical. To assume that powers are applied and laws 
enforced, simply because they exist, is to grossly oversimplify the field of 
urban security governance. Empirical investigation reveals such governance 
to be characterized by subtle organizational and interpersonal power-plays 
which result directly, in the case of the NTE, from the contested nature 
of the field (Dennis and Martin, 2005). The state and its local ‘statutory 
authorities’ do not hold all the cards in the regulatory game, nor could 
they ever hope to do so given the social and economic complexities of the 
contemporary nightscape.
Notwithstanding the above, current levels of public, media, and political 
concern about alcohol continue to create a highly sensitized policy arena in 
which new powers are allocated to local statutory partnerships such that 
they may mould nightlife as never before. Controls are applied differentially, 
not only across areas, but also according to types of venue and social scene, 
as variously manifested in substance use preferences, consumer behaviours/
expectations, and commercial business models (Graham and Homel, 2009; 
Hadfield, 2004, 2008; Hadfield and Measham, 2009). CDRPs are actively 
promoting and facilitating certain forms of leisure/cultural activity, while 
at the same time adjusting, restraining or banishing others. Examples of 
the latter include the City of Westminster’s ‘lighter touch’ approach to 
the licensing of restaurants, while the former is exemplified by Devon and 
Cornwall Constabulary’s use of s.160 Closure Orders to prevent the hosting 
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Developments on the horizon include the Policing and Crime Bill 2009 
(currently in Lord’s Committee Stage) which proposes the introduction of 
a set of national ‘mandatory licensing conditions’ for licensed premises and 
‘discretionary local licensing conditions’ that can be applied to groups of 
two or more premises in any given area (Home Office, 2009). The Bill also 
seeks to amend police powers to deal with young people drinking alcohol 
in public. If passed, it will create a new offence of ‘persistently possessing 
alcohol in a public place’. Young people under 18 can be prosecuted for this 
offence if they are caught with alcohol in a public place three times within a 
12 month period. The maximum punishment for this will be a level-two fine 
(currently £500). In addition, the Bill proposes that lap-dancing venues—
rarely associated with disorder—are to be legally re-classified (subject to 
licensing authority designation), bringing them under the remit of the more 
stringent laws governing Sex Encounter Establishments  (Hadfield and 
Measham, 2009; Hubbard, 2008).
Concerns arise in relation to ways in which the skewing of crime policy 
towards the most visible manifestations of Britain’s ‘alcohol problem’ may 
be permitting a more general expansion of control over the actions of those 
who occupy the public realm across a range of social settings and contexts. 
As in other areas of anti-social behaviour policy, the heaviest price in terms 
of criminalization is exacted upon those who have the least ability to resist 
the label: young people who procure public spaces for informal assembly, 
drinking and socializing and are ripe for repression in this respect, in Britain, 
as elsewhere (Basanta, 2009; Crawford, 2009; Selmini and Nobili, 2009). As 
Crawford (2007) notes, regulation is much more likely to prove ‘responsive’ 
to the needs and wishes of the regulated in the case of big business, much 
less so when dealing with individuals. Yet, outcomes vary. Despite central 
government attempts to steer and standardize their use, anti-social behaviour 
powers and their accompanying guidance are filtered and reinterpreted by 
local criminal justice practitioners and administrative bodies for whom there 
have been significant consequences in terms of resources, capacity building 
and professional skills development. Responses to crime and disorder are 
thus multi-faceted, diffuse, and differentiated, often involving significant 
degrees of locally-directed responsibilization and third-party enrolment 
(Hadfield, 2009b).
The joys and ills of contemporary nightlife raise key questions about the 
conditions necessary to achieve civil and diverse urban spaces; put differ-
ently, where are we to find the ‘social’ in the debate on anti-social behaviour 
in our towns and cities after dark when it proves so difficult to even achieve 
the co-presence of different generations and communities? Have the optim-
istic visions of a more convivial NTE so characteristic of public debate a 
decade hence now evaporated into grim cynicism concerning a nation’s 
problematic relationship with alcohol? The post-2003 Licensing Act context 
is a complex one in which the art of urban security governance involves 
attempts to balance the seductions of the market, consumer freedoms and 
civil liberties, with surveillance, securitization and repression. Whilst the Criminology & Criminal Justice 9(4) 482
relative power of the various stakeholders may ebb and flow, it seems likely 
to remain ever thus.
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